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ARMED VESSELS 
H. M. SUBMARINE "E-14" 
([1920] A. C. 403) 
ON APPEAL FROM THE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND 
Prize court-Prize bounty-Destruction of enemy transport-Enemy 
"armed ship"-Naval prize act, 1864 (27 and 28 Viet. c. 25), 
section 42 
An order in council of March 2, 1915, made pursuant to section 42 
of the naval prize act, 1864, provided for the payment of 
prize bounty to such of the officers and crew of any of H. 
M.'s ships of war as were present at the taking or destroying 
of any "armed.ship" of the enemy. 
In May, 1915, a British submarine torpedoed and sank a Turkish 
transport having on board 6,000 Turkish troops, who had 
with them rifles and ammunition, also six field guns so dis-
posed on the ship's deck that, at suitable ranges, they could 
have been used with effect against the submarine. The 
ship was a Turkish fleet auxiliary manned by naval ratings 
and commanded by Turkish naval officers; she carried as 
part of her regular equipment a few light quick-firing guns. 
The officers and crew of the submarine applied to the prize 
court for prize bounty: 
Held, that the meaning of the words "armed ship" in section 42 
was not limited to a ship commissioned and armed for the 
purpose of offensive action in a naval engagement, and that 
the applicants were entitled to prize bounty under the order 
in council. 
Judgment of the prize court reversed. 
Present: Lord Sumner, Lord Parmoor, 'rhe Lord Jus-
tice Clerk, and Sir Arthur Channell. 
Appeal from judgments of the admiralty division (in 
prize) dated February 21, 1917,1 and November 25, 1918.2 
The officers and crew of H. M.'s submarine E-14 by a 
motion in the prize court sought a declaration that they 
were entitled to £31,375 as prize bounty for the destruc-
tion of the Turkish transport Guj Djeml on May 10, 1915. 
The prize bounty was claimed under an order in council 
of March 2, 1915, made in pursuance of section 42 of thP 
naval prize act, 1864 (27 and 28 Viet. c. 25), 'vhich refers 
to the destruction of any "armed ship" of the enemy. 
1(1917]P.85. 2 Unreported. 
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The president (Sir Samuel Evans), by a judgment 
delivered on February 21, 1917, held that the meaning of 
the 'vords ''armed ship" in section 42 was "a fighting 
unit of the fleet, a ship commissioned and armed for the 
purpose of offensive action in a naval engagement." He 
found that the evidence before him did not bring the Guj 
Djemal within that description and dismissed the applica-
tion, but 'vithout prejudice to the claimants renewing it 
upon any further evidence that might be forthcoming. 
The motion was renewed before the president (Lord 
Sterndale) on November 25,. 1918, further evidence being 
adduced. The effect of the evidence given upon the t'vo 
applications appears from the judgment of their lord-
ships. 
Lord Stern dale, P., considered that he was not at liberty 
to depart from the principles laid do"rn in the decision 
above referred to, and held that the fresh evidence did not 
render the transport an "armed ship" within those prin-
ciples. The motion was accordingly dismissed. 
cl~~~;.nt ror October 21, 1919. Sir Erle Richards, K. C., and G. P. 
Argument for 
Crown. 
Langton for the claimants: Prize bounty was payable 
under the order in council, since upon the evidence the 
Guj Djemal was an "armed ship" of the enemy. There is 
nothing in the acts in force before the naval prize act, 
1864, nor in the decisions, which indicates that the mean-
ing of the plain words used should be limited as held in 
the prize court. [Reference was made to Several Dutch 
Schuyts/ 3 L' Alerte~· 4 La Olorinde)· 5 The Sedulous/ 6 6 
Anne, c. 13, s. 8; 43 Geo. 3, c. 160, s. 37; 45 Geo. 3, c.72, 
s. 5; 17 and 18 Viet. c. 18, ss. 3, 11.] Prize bounty has been 
awarded under the order in council for the sinking of 
ships not coming within the principle applied in the 
present case-namely, a patrol ship and an armed mine 
layer: See H. M. Submarine E-11, 7 and The Konigen 
Luise. 8 
Sir Gordon Hewart, A. G., and J. G. Pease for the 
respondent, the procurator general. The view of the 
late President as to the meaning of the words "armed 
ship" was right. The reference in section to "the begin-
ning of the engagement" and the basis upon which the 
a (1805) 6 C. Rob. 48. 
• (1806) 6 C. Rob. 238. 
e (1814) 1 Dod. 436. 
a (1813) 1 Dod. 253 . . 
7 Lloyd's List, June 26, 1916. 
• Lloyd's List, Feb. 27, 1917. 
SUBMARINE E-14: 
bounty is to be computed indicate that what \Vas 1neant 
was a fighting unit of a fleet. In. the unreported cases 
in which during the present war prize-bounty has been 
awarded for the destruction of patrol ships, minelayers, 
or arn1ed auxiliary ships, the point that the order in 
council did not apply '\Vas not taken. 
December 3. The judgment of their lordships \Vas 
delivered by-Lord SuMNER: In this appeal the com-
mander, officers and crew of H. M.'s submarine E-14 
seek, pursuant to 27 and 28 Viet. c. 25, s. 42, and the 
order in council dated March 2, 1915, to establish their 
right to a grant of £5 per head of the 6,000 Turkish 
troops, and of the 200 ship's complement, who were on 
board of the Guj Djemal, \Vhen they destroyed her with 
a torpedo in the Sea of Marmora, near Kalolimno Is-
land, on May 10, 1915. The troops had their rifles and 
ammunition, and with them were six Krupp 75-mm. 
field· guns, also with ammunition, and so disposed on 
the ship's deck astern that at suitable ranges they could 
have been used against the E-14 with effect. The ship 
herself was part of the Ottoman naval force, a fleet 
auxiliary manned by naval ratings and commanded by 
officers of the Navy of the Sublime Porte, and she carried 
a few light quick-firing guns as part of her regular 
equipment, with which she could defend herself if neces-
sary. At the time in question she was acting as a 
troop transport, and this would appear to have been her 
regular employment. She was on her way to the 
Dardanelles, and it was known to the Turkish Govern-
ment that British submarines had passed up the straits 
for the purpose, among others, of interfering with that 
traffic. 
By section 42 of the naval prize act, 1864, the right 
in question would attach if the Guj Djemal was, in the 
words of the section, "an armed ship of any of His 
Majesty's enemies." This is entirely a matter of con-
struction of the section in its application to the facts 
of this case, and no other question \Vas raised in the 
appeal. Little assistance, if any, is · to be derived from 
prior decisions or earlier legislation. No decision before 
the war turned on or touched this section, and in the 
cases decided during the war the present contention had 
not been raised. The older acts go back for many genera-
tions. At one time the number of guns, and not of men 
105 
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carried by the ship destroyed, was the measure of the 
grant, and until the Crimean War the expression, "armed 
ship, " was not used. No settled practice was shown to 
have existed in the grant of "head money," as it was 
called, that could be regarded as affecting the ordinary 
meaning of the words of the section, and no reasons of 
policy were suggested, which would point to an intention 
to use those words in one sense rather than in another. 
It is plain on the facts that the Guj Djemal was a. ship, 
and a large one; that she was a ship of His Majesty's 
enemies, a unit in the Turkish fleet; and that she "ras 
armed. If then these single and undisputed facts are 
put together, she was in fact " an armed ship of His 
Majesty's enemies." Why was she not so within sec-
tion 42 ~ It is true that she was used to transport troops. 
It is true also that she got no chance to use her arms, 
or at least none that Turkish troops or seamen were 
minded to take; such is the nature of an injury by a 
well-placed torpedo. It is true that she did not go forth 
to battle, nor was she in any case fit to lie in the line, 
but the section says nothing about this. It may be that 
her regular service consisted in carrying troops and 
stores and that her combatant capacity was not high, but 
it can hardly be doubted that, if a suitable opportunity 
had occurred, it would have been her duty to fight and 
even to attack a hostile submarine. 
The contention presented on behalf of the Crown was, 
that her main character was that of a transport, and 
that the fact that she was armed "\Vas only an incident. 
The section, however, does not distinguish between the 
purposes for which the armed ship is armed, nor does it 
confer or withhold the grant according as the armament 
carried is the main or an incidental characteristic of the 
enemy sovereign's ship. The contention prevailed 'vith 
the late president, who gave effect to it in the following 
words: 9 "An armed ship, "\Vi thin the meaning of the 
section to be construed, is a fighting unit of the fleet, a 
ship commissioned and armed for the purpose of offensive 
action in a naval engagement." 
Evidently this proposition is open to several objections. 
It makes the rights of His Majesty's forces depend on 
the purpose "\vith "\vhich his enemies may have dispatched 
their vessel, on 'vhat either 'vay is a vrarlike service. It 
Q [1917], pp. 85, 89. 
OFFENSIVE ACTION 
employs a term, ''offensive action," which, in practice, 
is of indefinite meaning, and in any case involves an 
inquiry into the state of mind of the hostile commander. 
Sir Samuel Evans elucidated his meaning thus in another 
passage: ''In my opinion, if it were proved that she 
carried a few light guns, that would not constitute her 
an armed ship any more than a merchant vessel armed 
for self defense; nor v:ould the fact that she carried 
troops armed with rifles and some field guns and other 
ammunition intended to be used after the landing of the 
troops.'' 
Their lordships are unable to accept these propositions. 
Of the case of a merchant ship they say nothing, for this 
is a question on the meaning of the words "ship of the 
enemy," and the appellants did not contend, nor needed 
they to do so, that any ship but one in state service would 
be covered by those words. There is again no evidence 
that the rifles and field pieces were not intended to be 
used at sea under any circumstances, little as any occasion 
for their use was to be looked for, and it must be recol-
lected that defense is not confined to taking to one's 
heels or even to returning a blo\v, but, in the jargon of 
strategy, may consist in an offensive-defensive, or in 
plain words in hitting first. No criteria would more 
embarrass the application of the enactment than these, 
and to introduce the test of the ship's commission is to 
introduce something which involves a rewriting of the 
section. 
Their lordships are of opinion that the \Vords of the sec-
tion are plain, and that the facts fit them, and accordingly 
the appellants are entitled to succeed; that the decree 
appealed against should be set aside; and that this appeal 
should be allowed with costs, and that the case should be 
remitted to the prize court to make such formal decree 
in favor of the appellants as may be required. Their 
lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. 
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IN THE MATTER OF THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 
MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-15 (H. M. S. "ESPIEGLE" AND· 
OTHER VESSELS) 
([1923], p. 149) 
Prize court-Prize bounty-" Armed ship" of the enemy-Lighters· 
carrying troops-Estimate of numbers of persons on board-Naval 
prize act, 1864 (27 and 28 Viet. c. 25), s. 42 
By an order in council of March 2, 1915, which put into operation 
section 42 of the naval prize act, 1864, prize bounty at the· 
rate of £5 for each person on board the enemy's ship wa;:;. 
payable to such of the officer and crew of any of His Majes--
ty's ships of war as were present at the taking or destroying. 
of any "armed ship" of the enemy: 
lleld, applying the principles stated in H. M. sub1narine E. 14 [1920] 
A. C. 403, that it was not necessary for the ship herself to 
carry any armament structurally attached to her, and that 
enemy lighters carrying troops armed with rifles were 
"armed ships" within the meaning of the section. 
No accurate figures being available to establish the numbers of the· 
persons on board the enemy vessels, the court, believing the· 
claimants' estimate to have been made with the intention 
of accuracy, accepted it. 
Motion for an award of prize bounty in accordance 
with the provisions of section 42 of the naval prize act, 
1864 (put into operation by an order in council of March 
2, 1915), on behalf of Capt. Wilfrid Nunn, R.N., and the-
officers and ships' companies of various sloops, launches, 
and other craft, as being present at the capture or de-
struction of the armed Turkish vessels set out in the fol .... 
lowing schedule: 
Number Amount 
Date of of per- of prize Name of II. M. S. Name of enemy vessel sons on 
engaged capture or captured or destroyed board bounty destruction at £5 enemy per head vessel 
R. M. s. Espiegle _____ Nov: 9, 1914 Turkish river gunboat_ ___ 12 £60 Do _______________ Nov. 19,1914 _____ do ____________________ 12 60 Do _______________ 
rurklsh gunboat Marma- I 66 330 
ris. 
H. M.S. Odin _________ 'June I and 2, Turkish armed v esse 1 s 1 230 1, 150· 
1915. l\riosul and Bulbul. I 32 160-
H. M.S. Clio _________ 7 armed Turkish barges ____ 1 714 3,570 
H. M.S. Shaitan ______ 7 armed Turkish mahelas __ 1 315 1,575 Do _______________ 
II. M.S. Comet _______ rmed Turkish vessel 20 100 Sebah. 
H. M.S. Sumarra _____ Armed Turkish vessel 26 130 
June 3,1915 Samarra. 
H. 11. S. Lewis Pelly __ Armed Turkish lighter ____ 1 300 1,500 
II.M. S. L. 3 _________ 3 other armed Turkish I 300 1, 500· 
lighters. 
3 armed horse boats ___ 
H. M.S. Shushan ____ July 24,1915 Turkish river gunboat_ ___ 12 60 
Total ___________ 
------------·-- ----------------------------,----------1 10, 195-
I At least. 
OPERATIONS IN MESOPOTAMIA 
The facts are fully set out in the judgment. 
The claim was resisted by the Crown on the ground 
that the vessels were destr'oyed in the course of joint 
naval and military operations. It was also contended 
that as it appeared from the claimants' affidavits that 
some of the enemy vessels were lighters and mahelas not 
fitted with any armament, the mere fact that they were 
carrying troops armed with rifles was insufficient to make 
them "armed" vessels within the meaning of section 42 
Df the naval prize act. The point was further taken that 
no accurate evidence was available as to the number of 
persons on board the enemy vessels. 
Wilfrid Lewis for the claimants. 
C. W. Lilley for the procurator general. 
[In the course of the arguments it was con tended that 
the decision of the privy council in H. M. submarine 
E. 14 10 was not an authority for the proposition that a 
lighter carrying armed men was an ''armed ship." Lord 
Sumner, in mentioning "troops armed with rifles," was 
merely going through the various sorts of armaments 
held by Sir Samuel Evans in the court below as being 
insufficient, in his opinion, to constitute an "armed ship"; 
and Lord Sumner, dealing with the qualifications as a 
whole, said that their lordships were unable to accept 
those propositions. In fact the troopship sunk by the 
E. 14 had several light field guns on board.] 
March 5. The President (Sir Henry Duke) read the 
following judgment: These are a series of claims for 
prize bounty under the provisions of the naval prize act, 
1864, section 42, on behalf of Capt. Wilfrid Nunn, R. N., 
and the officers and crews of various sloops, launches, 
and a~med horse boats in His Majesty's service which 
'vere engaged during 1914 and 1915 in operations on the 
River Tigris and Euphrates against naval forces of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
Prize bounty is payable under section 42 by distribu-
tion among such of the officers and crews of any of His 
Majesty's ships of war as are actually present at the 
taking or destruction of any armed ship of any of His 
Majesty's enemies of a sum calculated at the rate of £5 
for each person on board the enemy's ship at the begin-
ning of the engagement. By section 2 of the statute 
the term "ship of war of I-Iis Majesty" includes any 
vessel of 'var of His Majesty and any hired armed ship or 






vessel in His Majesty's service. Captain Nunn, as 
senior naval officer of the Persian Gulf division of the 
East Indies station, had under his command at the time 
of the various operations here in question a diversity of 
vessels, including horse boats, but there is no dispute 
that all the claimants' vessels come under the description 
of ships and vessels of His Majesty which are included 
in the provisions of section 42. 
or The operations for which prize bounty is claimed are 
the sinking and destruction of a Turkish river gunboat 
on November 9, 1914, by H. M.S. Espiegle near Muham-
march, on the Tigris, at a point distant some 40 or 45 
miles from the river mouth; the sinking on November 
19, 1914, by the Espiegle some miles farther up the 
Tigris of a Turkish gunboat, which 'vas salved and be-
came H. M. S. Flycatcher; the sinking of the Turkish 
gunboat Marmaris and capture of the steam vessels 
Bulbul and Mosul and the capture of numerous barges 
and mahelas on June 1 and 2, 1915, in the Tigris upriver 
from the junction of the Tigris '3.nd the Euphrates at 
Qurnah; the capture on June 3, 1915, at Amarah, son1e 
90 miles upriver beyond Qurnah, of various steam ves-
sels and lighters; and the destruction on July 24, 1915, 
at N asiriyah on the Euphrates, some 120 miles beyond 
Basra, of a Turkish river gunboat. The distances I 
have stated, which are roughly estimated, indicate the 
extent of Captain Nunn's field of operations. 
The questions raised at the hearing 'vere 'vhether the · 
capture and destruction of the various vessels in respect of 
which the claims arise were effected solely by the respec-
tive claimants or were joint operations of naval and mili-
tary forces; whether the ships and vessels captured and 
destroyed were "armed," within the meaning of the term 
as used in section 42 ;~and vvhat are the numbers in respect 
of which, if at all, these claims for prize bounty ought to 
be allowed. 
The duty of the naval forces in Mesopotamia in course 
of which the vessels under consideration vvere captured 
or sunk was that of cooperation with the n1ilitary expe-
ditionary force under the immediate command of Gen. 
Sir Charles Townshend. Apart fron1 this general duty 
Captain Nunn, as senior naval officer, was under the 
orders of the commander in chief on the East Indies sta-
tion and of the board of admiralty. 
JOINT MILIT:ARY ACTION 
The claims made in respect of the sinking on November 
9, 1914, of a Turkish gunboat off Muhammareh Island, 
the sinking on November 19, 1914, of another gunboat 
higher up the Tigris, the sinking on June 1, 1914, of the 
gunboat Marraaris, and the sinking on July 24, 1915, of 
an unidentified gunboat on the Euphrates were not dis-
puted at the hearing. 
The allegation on the part of the Treasury that the 
events out of which the claims arise 'vere joint acts of 
military and naval forces depended upon the scheme of 
the operations in which the same occurred and the terms 
in which the incidents themselves were described in mili-
tary dispatches, the pronouns "'ve" and "ours" being 
used as to each of them, though without anything of a 
precise nature to indicate that th~ language employed 
was used with regard to things actually done by troops 
as distinguished from naval forces. The issue here 
depends upon ascertaining what was in fact done. At 
the end of May, 1915, when the Turkish forces retreated 
from Qurnah toward Basra, a combined advance of 
British troops and naval forces took place which covered 
the period of the disputed claims. The naval forces dur-
ing this time reconnoitered for the army, conducted the 
transport operations when river transport was used, and 
from time to time successfully engaged Turkish naval 
forces and overtook and captured various vessels which 
were conveying Turkish troops and munitions-inclusive 
of field guns, bombs, mines, rifles, and ammunition. Sir 
Charles Townshend was, at material times, with an officer 
of his staff, on board whatever vessel was being used by 
the senior naval officer as his flagship, and other military 
officers were distributed among other vessels in the com-
mand. The bridge of the flagship commanded the sur-
rounding country, and the general used it for purposes of 
observation. His communication 'vith his forces 'vas to 
some extent maintained by wireless telegraphy from the 
flagship. He was kept informed· of what was being done 
under Captain Nunn's command, but he did not direct 
and he took no part in the operations of the naval force. 
On board one of the vessels was a detachment of an 
English regiment which had been detailed for service 
under naval command and 'Yhich acted in the capacity 
of marines. The advance beyond Basra to A1narah 'vas 
one in 'vhich the army and navy closely cooperated, and 
I believe the kno,vledge that troops 'vere advancing was 
an inducement to the surrender by Turkish forces of some 
111 
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of the captured craft. But no troops were upon the scene 
when any of the sinkings and captures in question were 
carried out, and I am of opinion, upon like grounds of 
principle to those which I stated in the somewhat similar 
case of The Sulman Palc,11 that these several sinkings and 
captures were solely effected by the respective claimants. 
Armed vessels. The question whether the lighters and mahelas in 
question were armed vessels is perhaps not directly 
covered by H. M. submarine E-14,10 to which reference 
was made, but guidance is to be found there which helps 
in its determination. On behalf of the Crown it was 
submitted that only the gunboats manned by Turkish 
naval forces were ''armed vessels," so as to be the 
subject of claims for prize bounty. The material fact 
with regard to the lighters and mahelas here in question 
is that they were conveying armed troops who had at 
their disposal on board these vessels an abundance of 
weapons capable of being used for the destruction of His 
Majesty's ships and vessels which were in action against 
them. These troops with the weapons at their disposal 
could without any exceptional display of skill or courage 
have put out of action most, if not all, of the claimants. 
The substance of the question, as it was presented to me, 
was whether vessels so provided as these craft were must 
be excluded from the category of armed vessels by reason 
of the fact that they were not built for combatant action 
and had not at the time of their capture any armament 
which was structurally attached to them. Inasmuch as 
the several vessels were ships of the enemy, and in each 
instance carried troops "armed, or provided with arms,''· 
with which they could have fought and destroyed His 
Majesty's vessels (by which in fact they were destroyed 
or captured), I must decide this question in favor of the 
claimants. 
No accurate figures are available to establish the 
numbers of the persons who were on board the several 
enemy vessels described in the claim at the beginning of 
the various engagements. It is a matter of estimate, 
and, as I believe the estimate of the claimants to have 
been made with the intention of accuracy, I accept it. 
There will accordingly be awards in favor of the several 
claimants of the amounts stated in the schedule to the 
notice of motion. That will be a total award of £10,500. 
10 [1920] A. C. 403. 11 [1922], p. 73. 
DESTRUCTTON OF TURKISH VESSELS 
IN THE MATTER OF THE DESTRUCTION OF CERTAIN 
ARMED TURKISH VESSELS (H. M. SUBMARINE ttE. 12") 
([1924], p. 29) 
Prize court-Prize bounty-Armed vessels carrying munitions of 
war-Destruction of small Turkish sailing vessels-Armed ships 
of the enemy-Naval prize act, 1864 (27 and 28 Viet. c. 25), s. 42 
Acting on the instructions of the naval commander in chief, the 
claimants, the officers and crew of a British submarine, 
sank by gunfire a number of small Turkish sailing vessels 
engaged in carrying munitions of war to the Turkish military 
bases and arsenals in the Sea of Marmora. 
The vessels did not carry any armament structurally attached to 
them, but their crews were armed with rifles and, on each 
occasion when attacked, the crews took to their boats, got 
ashore, and opened fire on the submarine with their rifles. 
By an order in council of March 2, 1915, which put into operation 
section 42 of the naval prize act, 1864, prize bounty at the 
rate of £5 for each person on board the enemy's ship is 
payable to such of the officers and crew of any of His 
Majesty's ships of war as are present at the taking or 
destroying of any armed ship of the enemy: 
Held, that the inference to be drawn from the facts that the com-
mander of the submarine had instructions to sink sailing 
craft of the sort in question and that in each case the crews, 
instead of scattering and making their escape, opened fire 
on the submarine, was that these sailing vessels had been 
taken under the control of the Turkish administration, and 
were not to be regarded merely as merchant vessels in 
private ownership engaged in the carriage of contraband. 
They were therefore ships of the enemy within the meaning 
of section 42. 
Held, further, that the vessels were armed ships when they were 
attacked, and that it would give too restricted an operation 
to the rights provided by the statute to hold that they had 
ceased to be armed ships because their crews with their 
rifles had left before the vessels were actually destroyed. 
The claimants, therefore, were entitled to an award of 
prize bounty. 
Motion for an award of prize bounty in accordance 
with the provisions of section 42 of the naval prize act, 
1864. 
The claimants, Commander Bruce, D. S. 0., R. N., 
and the officers and crew of H. M. submarine E. 12, 
claimed declarations that they were entitled to a'va.rds 
of prize bounty in respect of the destruction in the Sea 
of Marmora, on September 21, 1915, of six rrurkish 
sailing vessels with a complement of 30 men; and on 
October 5, 1915, of a steamship and 15 sailing vessels 
with a total complement of 70 men. 
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The question at issue was whether the sailing vessels 
were to be regarded as ordinary merchant vessels engaged 
in run 1ing contraband cargoes or as armed ships of the 
enemy within the meaning of section 42 of the naval 
prize act, 1864. 
'1'he facts are summarized in the headnote and are fully 
set out in the judgment. 
Argument for Wilfrid Lewis for the claimants: The evidence in the 
claimants. 
possession of the commander in chief showed that vessels 
of this type were being employed by the Turkish naval 
authorities for the carriage of munitions of \Var; and it is 
immaterial whether th~y were state owned or merely char-
tered by the state. Their crews carried rifles, and the 
vessels therefore were armed ships within the meaning of 
section 42 of the naval prize act: In the Matter of the 
Naval Operations in Mesopotamia, 1914-15.12 If they 
were armed ships, however, it is submitted that they 
would come within the section even if they were owned by 
subjects of the enemy state. This question was left open 
by Lord Sumner in H. M. submarine E. 14.13 Although 
fire was opened from the shore, at the beginning of the 
engagement the vessels were armed, notwithstanding that 
the rifles then on board were not fired till a later stage. 
c:Or~ent for Hilbery for the procurator general: These vessels were 
merely suspected of carrying munitions of war for the 
Turkish forces. There is no evidence that these small 
sailing craft were in the regular service of the enemy state 
or even that they had been pressed into that service. 
They would appear to have been ordinary merchant craft 
running contraband cargoes. Further, they were not 
armed ships when sunk or destroyed, and on that ground 
the case is distinguishable from In the Matter of the Naval . 
Statement 
facts. 
Operations in Jlfesopotamia, 1914-15.12 
or October 19. The PRESIDENT (Sir Henry Duke): 
These claims arise out of the action of H. M. submarine 
E. 12, which was detailed to enter the Sea of Marmora on 
various occasions when the approach \vas closed by naval 
defenses of the kind which during the war became familiar. 
The mere achievement of the passage into the Sea of 
Marmora conferred much distinction on the officers and 
men concerned, who had made a series of incursions 
before the raids no\v under consideration. 
t2 [1923] P. 149. 13 [1920] A. C. 403 
DESTRUCTION 
By September, 1915, acting on the information in his 
possession, Admiral de Robeck, who was in command, 
gave personal instructions to Commander Bruce that 
there 'vere certain classes of vessels with which he was to 
-deal. I am satisfied that the commander acted on those 
instructions, and that so acting he destroyed and sank the 
vessels in respect of which the present claim is made. 
1.'here is a claim in respect of the destruction on Septem-
ber 21 of what are described as 6 armed Turkish sailing 
vessels, and a claim in respect of an operation on October 
5, where the service alleged to have been rendered is the 
-destruction or sinking of an armed Turkish steamer and 15 
armed Turkish sailing vessels. The sailing vessels, as far 
as the information before me goes, were vessels cus-
tomarily engaged in time of peace in commercial business 
in the Sea of Marmora; normally they were commercial 
'Sailing craft, and were said to be at the time in question 
·engaged in carrying 'arious munitions of war. I have 
no doubt that they ·were so engaged. The positions 
in which they were found-in one case returning appar-
·ently from a trip to Panderma, where there were munition 
factories and arsenals, nnd on the other occasion going to 
or from Rodosto, where there were works used for military 
purposes by the Turkish authorities-make the character 
of their enterprise fairly clear, and they might ha.ve been 
captured as being vessels engaged in carrying contra-
band of war. 
But that does not dispose of this question. In some of 
the evidence there was a disposition to lay much stress on 
the fact that these vessels were engaged in carrying 
munitions of war; but that fact does not by any means 
constitute them armed vessels of the enemy. Even if 
these were vessels carrying munitions of war, and having 
arms on board and using them, the strong impression on 
my mind is that those facts would not be sufficient 
to constitute them armed vessels of the enemy. 
Commander Bruce and his brother officer, Lieutenant 
Commander Fox, gave evidence, and Commander Bruce 
told me the instructions which he received. Before he 
got these orders there was reason to suppose that a sub-
marine venturing near certain classes of craft in the Sea 
of Marmora, and neighboring "\Vaters, "'"ould be exceed-
ingly likely to find herself sunk by gunfire, or a bomb, 
or by other fire if she were in a position in 'vhich gunfire 
was not practicable. rrhe vessels in question lnight 'veil 
have engaged submarine E. 12 'vith success. 
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On September 21, 1915, Commander Bruce says he 
sighted six sailing vessels, and chased them into a small 
bay near Panderma. The cre\vs, numbering four or five 
in each vessel, abandoned their ships and fled to the 
shore, and immediately opened fire upon E. 12 \Vith 
rifles at a range of about 1,000 yards, and he says he 
sank the six. 
On October 5 the E.12 sighted a small enemy steamer 
and 17 enemy sailing vessels in Rodosto Bay. The 
steamer was armed, and she was fired upon, and the 
only question with regard to her is whether she \Vas 
destroyed. I will deal with that as a question of fact. 
It does not raise any matter of principle; she \Vas un-
doubtedly an armed vessel of the enemy. [His lordship 
held on the evidence that the steamer was destroyed.] 
The question against the claim in respect of the sailing 
craft is that they were being convoyed in the n1anner in 
which vessels are convoyed in time of war. The com-
mander says in his affidavit that the crews of the steamer 
and the sailing ships abandoned their ships, and that 
"immediately the crews of the sailing vessels reached the 
shore they opened fire upon me with rifles, which said 
rifles I verily believe had been taken by the said crews 
from on board the said steamer and the said sailing 
vessels. Owing to the said rifle fire I \Vas forced to keep 
2,000 yards from the said steamer and sailing vessels 
when engaged in destroying them. The crews of the 
said steamer and the said sailing vessels kept up a heavy 
fire upon me for about 30 minutes, when the battery at 
Erekli Point, about 5,000 yards distant, opened fire upon 
me; an enemy destroyer then appearing forced me to 
dive and to abandon the task of destroying the remain-
ing two sailing vessels." Commander ~ox, in respect 
of the proceedings on October 5, says: "The cre-\VS of the 
said steamer and the said sailing vessels landed at \Videly 
divergent points, and froln each of the said points at 
which the crews of the various vessels landed, and froln 
nowhere else, there im1nediately came an intense rifle 
fire, causing the E. 12 to stand off to a distance ot 2,000 
yards \Vhilst the work of destruction of the said stean1er 
and the said sailing vessels \Vas completed. From the 
intensity of the fire opened upon E. 12 I verily believe 
that there \Vere at least 50 persons firing upon us." He 
corroborates Commander Bruce as to the other incidents. 
ARMED PERSONNEL 
The facts I have stated are the materials on which I 
have to come to a conclusion whether these sailing vessels 
were armed vessels of the enemy. At the hearing I 
found it a perplexing task. There was a simple set of 
facts with very rudimentary information, and the in-
quiry is a serious one in point of principle. The amount of 
money involved here is not serious, but it is a serious 
thing to come to the conclusion, with regard to merchant 
vessels carrying men on board with arms, that they are 
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enemy. It involves considerations quite outside those 
relative to the subject of naval prize bounty; it affects 
the 'vhole status of persons engaged in commerce in time 
of war. 
It was argued with regard to the sailing vessels that 
they were not shown to be armed vessels of the enemy, 
and at any rate, as it stood on the evidence, that they 
'vere not armed vessels \Vhen they were sunk. If, how-
ever, they were armed vessels when they were engaged 
it \vould take a great deal of argument to persuade me 
that I ought to assume that they had ceased to be armed 
vessels because certain men had left them \vith their 
boats and taken certain weapons. I should not decide 
the case upon any such ground as that; I think it 'vould 
give too· restricted an operation to rights intended to be 
created by the naval prize act, and would introduce a 
fine point of law into what is really a broad question of 
fact. If the vessels \Vere armed vessels at all I should be 
ready to find that they \Vere armed vessels at the time 
that they were sunk. Were they armed vessels~ There 
is no evidence that they had any mounted arms or that 
they had been fitted for naval warfare, but the authorities 
have acquiesced for some time in the view that that is not 
conclusive. Manned by men instructed in the use of 
and armed with rifles, they were vessels sufficiently 
armed to have sunk submarines. Submarines had to 
keep 2,000 yards away from the shore because of the risk 
of being sunk, and I come to the conclusion that these 
"~ere at all n1aterial times armed vessels. 
The next question is whether they 'vere armed vessels "<?,! the ene-
of the enemy. I have said enough on the question of my. 
their being found w:ith munitions, or material for the 
manufacture of munitions, on board, as to 'vhether that 
would be sufficient to make them armed vessels of the 
enemy. I do not find that it 'vould. But I must look 
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further than that. I must try to see whether these 
vessels had been taken up by the Turkish authorities 
and taken under their control, and put in a position for 
offensive or defensive operations as part of the service of 
the forces afloat engaged in the military service of the 
Ottoman Government. It is true that I have not much 
information, but I am struck, and the more I have 
reflected on it I have been the more struck, with the 
action of the crews of the several vessels on the several 
occasions as to which I have had evidence. On each_ 
occasion these men, V\rho, on the hypothesis presented 
against the claim, are only seamen whose chief concern 
is to make their trip and to make it in safety, do not 
scatter and get out of the way, do not get into their 
boats and put up a flag or signal of some kind, but each 
vessel sends out an armed crew, positions are taken up 
along the shore, and rifle fire is opened upon the sub-
marine and maintained, in the first instance until the 
operation of sinking these vessels is complete, and in the 
second instance until a fort at a distance of 2% naval 
miles opens fire upon the submarine, and a Turkish 
destroyer approaches with the probability of sinking the 
submarine. Is that like the conduct of merchant sea-
men engaged in commercial traffic? I can not conceive 
that it is. I have the strongest possible suspicion, 
amounting in fact to conviction, that these men did 
what they were there to do. I do not regard the naval 
arrangements of the Turkish administration as I 'vould 
regard the naval arrangements of an administration with 
a highly organized naval service, like those of the great 
European powers; it is not the same thing at all. On 
the hypothesis, a party of merchantmen are earning their 
daily bread on the sea, and yet they behave on successive 
occasions in the manner I have indicated, sho,ving that 
they were an effective belligerent force. They engaged 
this submarine and might very well have sunk it. What 
does that mean~ I should have had a very definite 
suspicion as to what it meant without the affidavit of 
Sir Oswyn Murray, "\vho spoke of this transaction as an 
"engagement," although the term is not used in any 
technical sense, but merely by 'vay of description. I 
think he was perfectly accurate, and that there was an 
engagement, fought by armed ships 'vhich had been 
taken under the control of the Turkish administration 
by some means best kno"\vn to themselves, and that these 
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had become armed vessels of the Turkish administration. 
But there is something more. Admiral de Robeck, 
before Commander Bruce and his comrades set out on 
this expedition, told them that certain craft "\Vere to be 
sunk. Nobody can suppose for a moment that an officer 
in His Majesty's service 'vould be told to sink mere 
merchant ships, even though they were carrying contra-
band. What does it mean? I have nothing beyond the 
plain evidence of the officers, and it seems to me that I 
must take it that these vessels, which were replenishing 
the stores of the arsenals and munition factories on the 
Sea of 1\1armora, v1ere provided for in the way of defense 
by the Government which was using them, and that the 
practically certain consequence of the approach of a 
submarine was that they "\vould endeavor to sink her by 
the various means with which they '\Vere supplied. That 
seems to me to be a strong circumstance in this case. 
1'here is much which is left to conjecture and presump-
tion, but on the best consideration I can give to the case, 
and with no disposition to e·nlarge the provisions of the 
naval prize act by any careless consideration as to '\vhat 
are the circumstances under which prize bounty arises, 
I find that these sailing vessels were armed vessels of 
the ·enemy. 
There will be an award of prize bounty in the sun1 
claimed, £500. 
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